ABSTRACT: Schmitt's theologisation of sovereignty has been subjected, fifty years later, to a 'quarter turn' by Foucault's move from issues of domination to issues of government. After a further thirty years, radicalising Foucault, Agamben's archaeology of economy adds another 'quarter turn': the structure that emerges once the old European conjugality of facticity and validity, of praxis and being, emptied of all bonds, links, and loops, gives way to the bare opposition 'bipolarity'. The new constellation provides the old legal-theoretical (kelsenian) problem of rules unsuspended from a ruler who would authoriee them, with a new, unexpected, political content and with a change of epistemic paradigm.
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The suggestion that the human sciences are undergoing a paradigm change focuses, along foucaultian lines, on a shift of emphasis by which the 'groping' inquiry into documented data gives way to a measurable process of learning, performance and carrying out.
1 An attempt to gain insight into the effects of the archive (or 'arch-past') on the present is replaced by an effort to detect possibilities of control.
Agamben identifies the new a-historic paradigm with neuronal-system or geneticcode type objects. But are these objects more than mere show-cases of a more general trend? Once its distinctive move is identified (e.g. as the substitution of performance for experience) does the new paradigm, which Agamben traces to Chomsky's refoundation of linguistics, 2 not become recognisable as that of a whole galaxy of performance-related disciplines? In this galaxy, the Chomskyan constellation neighbours with socio-biology and other neo-post-neo-darwinist strands; yet we find also the economic analysis of law, a large gamut of current psychologies and, no doubt paradoxically, a methodologically ambitious enterprise such as Luhmann's theory of societal modernity. Is the distinctive feature, then, less the object at stake than the dynamics it triggers? The intriguing feature is, then, not multi-disciplinarity or cross-disciplinarity but a more specific pattern -a certain displacement or metabasis eis allo genos (shift to a different genre) -by dint of which the social sciences subscribe to a biological model, law to an economic model, and literary criticism or psychoanalysis to mediatised popular culture. Multiple processes of liquidation or 'boiling down' have in this way re-drawn the face of the episteme and 1 See Agamben (2008), pp. 82-111 (109ff.) ; in the present volume: 'Philosophical Archaeology', section 16.
2 Ibid.
2 given rise to an emergent network of new dependencies and hierarchies. The excessive success of Chomsky's own discoveries has resulted in sidelining them by a process of colonisation and provoked incomparably more new work in the field of the neurosciences than within linguistics itself. In his case as in others, that which figured as knowledge on one level (here: the linguistic level), figures on another level (the neurolinguistic, neuro-scientific level) as an opening to an indefinite potential for testing, performance, and self-re-enforcement.
The a-historic, performance-related paradigm which Agamben correctly identifies as (if prematurely limits to) neuronal and genetic research programmes, has its most important ramifications outside the academy, in that it gives rise to new forms of political subjection. The cybernetic term 'self-re-enforcement' designates, in application to knowledge about man, at once a governmental reality -not in the sense of 'executive branch', but of 'channelling conduct' -and refers to Foucault's analysis of arts of governing thirty years ago as much as to its supplementation by Agamben's genealogy of government today (Agamben 2008, pp. 82-111 (109ff.) . It is interesting to observe that political subjection itself has become 'foucaultian' over the decades since his death.
3 3 Or is it Foucault who has 'changed' -after his death? Certain new readings of his work approach it effectively as a pyramid in the midst of which the mummy of a Pharao of legal theory had been patiently awaiting its discovery, all along. Foucault made fun of marxists as 'traffic-wardens of the ideological traffic'; he marked his distance from the then 'society'-obsessed Left, in the (almost excessively ironical) title 'Society must be defended!' Yet, the possibility that he could be interpreted as a legal theorist had not even occurred to him. The suggestion would have provoked merriment -or one of the Instead of a governmental structure, the exercise of power over society within the limits of the rule of law, ensuring the undisturbed subjection of its subjects (as a means for establishing their felicitous co-existence, Aristotle's eu zēn), governmental action is now understood as an effort to adapt to and cope with, urgencies, circumstances, 'stuff [that] happens'; it is no longer structuralist, it is situationist. Elaborate arts of how best or most legitimately to govern populations and subjects, concocted throughout centuries, are replaced by the requirement of quickly coping with precarious circumstances. This 'coping' replaces the templates of ceteris paribus conditions which have been the economists' favourite paraphernalia for decades.
Circumstances are not governable; this is how they differ from subjects. If 'health is the silence of the organs' (Canguilhem, 1966) , a crisis is a noisy condition of the societal household. But a long-standing Western tradition has specialised in governing and in the creation of the subjectivity necessary to that effect; Foucault always made clear that his interest was in 'gouverner les hommes' (governing humans) not in steering circumstances. But the West is so passionate about subjectivity and governing humans that it has extended this double ticket to circumstances, to states, and produced a subject, namely the state, as an instrument for governing these. Circumstances or states outside unstoppable homerical outbursts for which he was known in town. The point is that
Foucault's decisive ability has much more to do with this joyful distance than with a hidden legal theory. Engaging with one's time, as Foucault understood it, did not mean subjecting oneself to its sovereign panacea and most cherished consensus. Throughout
Foucault's days, in the wake of '68, this sovereignly cherished object was 'society'; this is no longer so; at the time at which I am writing, it is law. 4 the body do not even have pain as a means of making themselves known -they must rely on interpretation (guess whose). But they can play up; in which case an über-state or exceptional state, a new form of subjective encoding of states, becomes necessary in order to circumvent interpretation and deconstruction and to assert the imperative of 'coping' and attention (the most precious commodity, according to Luhmann) under the threat of doom. The current neo-subjection is a by-product of 'coping' with circumstances; it is a collateral effect of increasingly precarious governmental decisionmaking in increasingly exposed waters.
Traditional subjection had typically been predicated upon a power that sustained some obscure but efficient deal with transcendence, now obliterated. Current neosubjection relies not on government's power, but on its powerlessness. What is at stake in this travesty, this carnevalesque return? Throughout a few centuries now, transcendencysigned power has proven amenable to domestication through checks and balances, charters, declarations, constitutions, etc. Their insufficiency used to be the main topic of politics. Now they are unaffordable. And the turn of instituted, categorical power into unadmitted, clandestine power is a reply to this situation. All power that acts, acts in the name of powerlessness. This means that it is straightforwardly not domesticable. This explains how it is possible that the new type of governmental subjection, which no longer flows from a transcendence-referred power but from a synapse within a network, an 64ff.), whose claim that God governs the world as if it governed itself provides Agamben (Il Regno e la Gloria, p. 313f), with his ultimate and key-stone reference. By claiming that creatures proceed, behave, act, govern themselves, etc., according to their own resolutions and rationalities, Bossuet offers a strictly autopoietic description.
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worthwhile to limit one's outlook to action-events or évènementalité (Foucault 1990, pp. 35-63), 6 being is the white spot on the map of the new societas faber, which autopoiesistheory substitutes for the ancient notion of a fabricating man, homo faber. There is no ideology-style denial to be found in Luhmann. The fact is nonetheless that being shows when and if they do, in connection with the epistemo-theology of the 15th century bishop
Nicholas of Kues. The problem here is not 'man' -it is not luhmannism's anti-humanism that is problematic: it is subjection. Whereas adaptation, 'coping', decision-making, do (and therefore show on the autopoietic screen), subjection is -and remains invisible.
Autopoiesis-theory has cut itself lose from being; a lot of oikonomic knowledge has thereby been gained; the price is that the bi-polar structure has fallen into foreclosure.
Let us recapitulate: the second pole of the bipolar structure which cannot be approached by social-scientific or systemic means can be denied. It can be externalised.
Those thinkers who refuse to do either are, generally, the philosophers. Their message is not always good news. The first among them, Anaximander, has been adamant about the impossibility of a structural displacement, a definitive interruption of the circle of righting or revenge. Any evolution in these fields was deemed irredeemably precarious and condemned to be resolved by a counter-evolution, like the swing of a pre-existing pendulum. Agamben's study of oikonomia/government and Power/Glory focuses at both poles. Different from Anaximander, the second pole is no longer understood as 'revenge', but as Glory (or in Greek: doxa). Bi-polarity in Agamben's treatise relates to the coordination between the power-equipped but uselessly immobile 'glorious' instances of reign and power, and the powerless and faceless, yet irresistible operations of 'coping':
long-term crisis management and emergency governance. It refrains from suggesting a reduction of the two poles to one.
The bi-polar conception both replaces and aggravates the traditional genteel tension between pouvoir constitué and pouvoir constituant. It introduces in its stead the irreconcilable split and consummate mutual exteriority of non-governing power and governing non-power. The longstanding and proverbially resilient figure of a social contract itself is dissolved or de-mediatised. The Greek noun authentēs designates a person who has committed (as opposed to have merely instigated) an action or a deed, e.g. perpetrated a murder or executed a death penalty (Liddell and Scott 1996) . That politics can be authentic in this strict sense is evidenced by any actor, whether collective or individual, who holds power and endeavours to bring it to fruition in, first, making her or his choice, then sticking to it against whatever resistance it might encounter. Where the calculus of the optimising and/or maximising of mere means -or, in other words, the care for the household -has absorbed the margin of manoeuvre of political choice, and subordinated politics to its own adaptive strategies, politics has, if one looks below the mask of its semantic and mediatic flourishing, really disappeared or persists only in a transformed state, as mimicry-politics or inauthentic politics.
This inauthenticity is what is epitomised by the notion of a crisis. What creates an inauthentic totality is, technically speaking, the split of the nexus of action and being.
Politics, under the take-over by oikonomia, changes radically: it is no longer in possession of the (in a sense) 'sovereign' and in any case incomparable rank it has been variously invested with throughout times ancient, medieval, early modern and modern. 14 name or, to be precise, the official title (gr. 'Christos' just translates the Hebrew word 'messiah', meaning 'the anointed' 14 ) of the trustee in whose service and action (used in another's name and power) the government of the world, the care for the world, and indeed the care for the care for the world, emerge within the history of God. Christ and the event of incarnation mark the point at which a new chapter of God's history starts, a chapter no longer written in the sign of the strict monotheism of a creator-God to which every life remains indebted, but in the sign of an agency that is in charge of an existing creation and its household. This agency or household is the God who, both in spite of and in virtue of the enigma this involves, is at once one and three.
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Since the advent of his second and third person, God himself has become an oikonomic entity and has taken up the duty of caring for and governing his creation. But the basic building blocks of the trinitarian creed have been laid in the life-time and, mostly, also the presence of Constantine the Great, the first Christian Roman Emperor, in the earlier 4th century. The history of the West and its (once-)celebrated 'take-off', is courtesy to the Christian God who has accepted to carry the cross once again, and to act, not according to the sovereign whim or privilege wielded by a master of the universe, but humbly in the sign of the minus of ministry, the limited means of government and governmental care. God cares for the world, as a supplement to creation, and as the model of human government that has been followed by governmental rationality during Yet, the way that leads from the created creation to the manageable creation is (anything but unquestionable?) questionable. Genesis tells us that after accomplishing the creation, God, far from now managing it, rests. There is no question of an oikonomos responding to the requirements of its maintenance, servicing, and protection; no mention that the creation is a household with a future of exposure to dangers and risks on a permanent basis, thus in constant need of further attention and protection, government, control, providence. All that creation needs is its creatures to inhabit it. The household view is Christian only, and it is additionally linked to the increase of the Church's social coexists purely externally with its opposite; a power that appears (in the media as earlier in the churches) but that cannot be used. Beyond the paradoxical pas de deux of an oikonomic governance enforcing its decrees in the name of its power's deficiency, and a glorious sovereignty deprived of means of making any 'difference that would make a 17 Agamben (2007) , chs. 7 and 8, pp. 187 ff., and 219 ff. On Habermas, consensus, government by consent, their analysis in liturgical terms, pp. 280-3.
